Memory and remembrance public policies in former Yugoslavia
“Although memory cannot represent the past as it actually happened, it is important to explore why people have chosen to remember what they remember”[1].
These words written by Claire Bancroft reveal the importance of analyzing the memories of a population. In that regard, the example of the former federation of Yugoslavia is highly relevant and interesting. The six countries that formed the federation split with extreme violence. Fratricidal fights brought blood among civilians and caused the death of hundreds of thousands of them as well as soldiers.
The national motto “Bratstvo i Jedinstvo” (fraternity and unity) which had prevailed in social interactions between the different entities flew away, taking with it dreams of lasting fraternal cohabitation. In the aftermath of these terrible battles, the time for the material reconstruction came as well as the one of the national identities of the newly born states. In this sense, the speeches of the political elites of each republic were tinged with nationalism. Even today, public policies, especially remembrance ones, urge national withdrawal and the veneration of supposed national heroes. Public remembrance policies therefore represent a dangerous nationalist strategy. However, despite the efforts of the leaders, it remains impossible to avoid the emergence of a real “Yugonostalgic” spirit among the inhabitants of countries born after the break-up of the former socialist state. One thing for sure is that the painful wounds of the dismemberment of the state have not yet healed and that peace remains fragile.
Similar remembrance policies at the service of analogous political ambitions
The creation of a national identity
The new-born countries that emerged after the implosion of the federation wish(ed) above all to achieve a national unity. Therefore, over the following years, remembrance policies praised national heroes to recall the greatness of the country and its glorious history before Tito’s period. For instance, in Serbia the idea of “Greater Serbia” and the Nacertanije developed in the 19th century by the Serbian Minister Ilija Garašanin is still being perpetuated. Pan-Serbianism as theorized by Vuk Karadžić is also taught from an early age on. Moreover, statues of national heroes are erected in the main cities such as the one of Franjo Tuđman (considered the liberator of Croatia and former leader of the HDZ) located in one of Zagreb’s major arteries.
When rebuilding ruined countries, statesmen of former Yugoslavian countries erase all traces of a shared past. The buildings are rehabilitated according to the architecture deemed legitimate (in Croatia, Italian and Austro-Hungarian influences — in BiH, Ottoman inspiration). The names of the streets are changed so that they are not linked to any common history. The example of the city of Mostar is extremely revealing. On the Croatian side, most of the street names that recall the Yugoslav period are substituted for others commemorating the croatian history. In this sense, Avenjia Jugoslovenske Nacionalne Armije (avenue of the Yugoslav national army) became Knez Branimira (Duke of Dalmatia in the 9th century). Likewise, Bulevar narodne revolucije(boulevard of the popular revolution) is renamed Bulevar Hrvastki Branitelja (boulevard of the Croatian defenders). Finally, many tags and graffiti eradicate the names of the towns written in Cyrillic.
Excluding remembrance policies: the example of education
The education imparted to young people in the Balkans is often biased. The textbooks provided to them are the ones which the state considers as legitimate. In this sense, the Yugoslav era is unfortunately often disowned. It is especially the case in Serbia and Croatia. Schools are also segregated: in some regions, minorities are not admitted to schools. The state or communities prohibit social and religious diversity (54 schools in BiH). In Kosovo, the division is even deeper. Children go to school at specific schedules according to their ethnicity and faith. In the morning, only Serbs are accepted, in the afternoons, Albanians are welcomed.
Likewise, Kosovo’s decades-long membership of Serbian governance is completely absent from textbooks of Albanians pupils. Conversely, Serbian children are taught a history oriented towards Serbian geonationalism. No reference is made to the contestation of the boundary between central Serbia and Kosovo (the latter is presented as a province of Serbia since Belgrade does not recognize its independence), without any mention of the self-proclamation of independence of Kosovo by the Albanian majority in 2008.
Language is also a major factor of conflict in the Balkans. For instance, Croatia tries to stand out through the language thanks to very traditional Croatian words. Western sounding terms are considered inappropriate and so are those used during the Yugoslav period. A linguistic purification is carried out. For example, the word “embassy” is spoken in Serbo-Croatian ambassada but the Croats demand that the term veleposanstvo be used.
“Memorycides”
Since the end of the war, a multitude of monuments and places reminiscent of the multiculturalism of Tito’s era have been entirely abandoned or destroyed. This is particularly the case of the Partizansko groblje(Partisans’ cemetery) located in Mostar. Bénédicte Tratnjek designates this phenomenon by the term “urbicide”[2]: the violence aims at the destruction of a city not as a strategic goal, but above all as an identity goal. Public policies seek to harmonize the territory and these establishments are reminders of the existence of an “other” within the national territory. Bénédicte Tratnjek explains that “constructions and reconstructions are at the heart of memory conflicts, insofar as these processes allow a symbolic marking of space”.
There are also places which deliberately omit the Yugoslav past and the war for economic purposes. The case of Dubrovnik is striking. There is hardly any mention of the war in Yugoslavia or any memorials. The goal is to promote mass seaside tourism. Advertising and media campaigns promote the acceptance of Dubrovnik (and Croatia) in the Mediterranean sphere rather than its Yugoslavian heritage.
Thus, memory must also be understood through the multiple disintegrations it undergoes because of the agents, often political, who pursue conflicts through symbolic violence. The different approaches to commemoration, through its use, manipulation, obliteration or rewriting, are therefore complementary.
Yugonostalgia: a common retrospective of a shared past
The notion of nostalgia
The feeling of nostalgia refers to a set of emotions that causes us to yearn for a time gone by; a time that sometimes has not even been lived. It brings to light a psychic mindset which leads to a feeling of melancholy and regret regarding memories and events of an ancient time. We can sum up this concept as a pain about an instant t experienced in the present time, that is to say t + 1. The word nostalgia results from the combination of two terms: nostos and algos, meaning respectively “return” and “suffering”. This painful aspiration to want to return to one’s country is extended to any lack linked to a lost time, to which it is now impossible to return or belong to, to a way of life that we have ceased to lead or quite simply to a time that never really existed.
In her book The Future of Nostalgia[3], the writer Svetlana Boym distinguishes two types of nostalgia: one so-called restorative and the other reflective. The first one is oriented towards the past, anchored in tradition and whose purpose is none other than to restore the truth. It is therefore an ideal of “historical reconstruction” that is promoted. It emphasizes nostos, which means the return to the native land, to the reconstruction of the past, “of a lost house”. On the other hand, reflective nostalgia is all about the desire and it calls into question official memories. It highlights a past that would be “like a value for the present, a meditation on history and the passage of time”. The goal is not to reconstruct the past but to live accordingly to it: the commemoration of the lost time remains positive and not suffered. It is therefore turned towards the present and often includes elements of counter-memory. She highlights that « reflective nostalgia does not pretend to rebuild the mythical place called home; it is “enamoured of distance, not of the referent itself. »
In the western Blakans, nostalgia is sometimes experienced by the people as a heavy shadow, sometimes as a sad veil and sometimes as an emancipatory hope.
Yugonostalgia in the daily life
Yugonostalgia is very visible in the field of music. Indeed, iconic Yugoslav musical groups are still listened to and still perform such as the band Bijelo Dugme. Founded in 1974 in Sarajevo by the famous artist Goran Bregović, they were (and still are) one of the most famous rock groups of the former Yugoslavia. Another equally popular music group, Rock Partyzani, composes and performs songs that are steeped in Yugoslav nostalgia and patriotism.
Within the film production, references to the Yugoslav era are also present. This is particularly the case in short films about the car industry in the former Yugoslavia. “Yugo”, is a film which director Mina Djukic discusses with a lot of humour, the most popular car of the Yugoslav period. Recently, the feature film “Cinema Komunisto”, directed by Mila Turajlic explores the history of the Yugoslav film industry and Tito’s relationship with cinema.
Quite simply, in the cities of the former Yugoslavia, themed restaurants are proliferating. This is the case in all states and especially in Serbia in the cities of Kragujevac and Belgrade. Meeting places are often named after Tito (Kod Tito = at Tito’s) or Tito’s coffee where the waiters are dressed as “Pioneers”. Finally, in Subotica, a park called Yugo-land was recently created and allows all yougonostalgics to come and meet.
Yugonostalgia: a resistance to nationalist values
Yugonostalgia strongly opposes the denial of the common roots that bind the different ethnicities and nations of former Yugoslavia. This melancholy is amplified by the instability of the states that have emerged after the war. Despite its shortcomings, Tito’s era offered individuals a deep sense of security and greater freedom than the one the experience today. This is especially the case in BiH where the state is still highly unsteady and whose foundation remains extremely precarious. In this regard, the former Yugoslavians use this feeling as a lever to demand greater consideration of their social and political demands.
Individuals are aware that there are still a common cultural, social, and even economic spaces which unite the different Republics despite the denials of the statesmen. Tim Judah developed the term “Yugosphere” to describe this collective space. He asserts that connections and bonds are still present within the Balkan region; the latter are even set to develop further in the coming decades. The author highlights the links which bind all the populations of the Western Balkans: a common language, a dynamic intra-Balkan trade, a job market where nationality or ethnicity is not an impediment to recruitment etc. According to him, the goal would be to promote and strengthen cooperation in specific areas, mainly economic and social development, infrastructure and energy, justice, cooperation in the field of security or the strengthening of human capital.
To conclude…
Remembrance issues are one of the primary concerns of politicians seeking to ensure the cohesion of their territory. Thus, commemorating policies are at the heart of the nation-building process. They ensure a popular dynamic of membership in so far as they allow individuals to feel that they are part of the community.
However, as I studied the construction of collective and official memories (ethno-centered and rival), I also analysed the way in which they interact with individual memory. If the goal of politicians was to erase traces of the common past shared by all ethnicities, the development of the phenomenon of Yugonostalgia proves that they have partly failed. Yugonostalgia can be understood as a form of dialogue between rival, opposing memories: official ones and intimately personal ones. Thus, this phenomenon remains a blurred area for statesmen because they cannot control it: it is a counter-memory beyond the reach of the dominant nationalist political discourses.
Memories in the former Yugoslavia seem more complex than elsewhere and carry more challenges both locally and internationally. The ideal scenario would undoubtedly be that, thanks to political memories combined with individual ones, each post-Yugoslav state could build on a united territory, a feeling of popular adhesion to the nation devoid of any destructive withdrawal of identity.
[1] BANCROFT Claire, Yugonostalgia: The Pain of the Present, SIT Study Abroad, 2009.
[2] TRATNJEK Bénédicte, “(Re)construire la ville comme lieu d’interface dans l’immédiat après-guerre : destruction de l’urbanité et symbolique des lieux dans la ville en guerre”, Colloque “La ville comme lieu d’interface”, 9e Colloque de la Relève, Montréal, 17–18 mai 2012,
[3] BOYM Svetlana, The future of Nostalgia, Basic Books, New York, 2001.
